



# **WIN ONE 11/11/11**

Edited by Graham Powell

A fresh start?

## Welcome to the 7<sup>th</sup> WIN ONE.

Every Edition represents, to a certain extent, a moment in time, this WIN ONE coming on a date which, to many people who have posted on the Internet, signifies a new beginning. That is why I have posted the question: “A fresh start?” on the front cover.

11<sup>th</sup> November also marks the anniversary of the end of the First World War, recent uprisings and disturbances reminding us that war is an ever present factor in human existence.

Several Birthdays of famous people also fall on 11<sup>th</sup> November, examples being the novelist Kurt Vonnegut, the gangster Charles ‘Lucky’ Luciano, J.H.C. Whitehead, the English mathematician, and Demi Moore, the American actress.

According to demographic calculations, on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1967 the world population reached almost 3.5 billion, that number doubling at the end of last month. The global population is set to double once more before the end of this century, a worrying prospect for our future generations, and something that must concern many of the people from over 190 countries who have visited the World Intelligence Network website since records began.

Yet, aside from these global and historical considerations, of immediate interest to the readers of this Edition must be the variety of the content that can be seen below, and I am thankful to all the thoughtful, creative members of the World Intelligence Network who have contributed to this WIN ONE. Some of the articles are contentious. I have put them in this Edition to incite people to comment on the opinions offered. This can be done on the WIN website, where members can set-up their own webpage to discuss whichever topic interests them; or, members can comment on topics which have already been started. Please have a look at that option, if you haven’t already done so, and feel free to explore the vast variety of pages available on the website.

Finally, I hope you enjoy reading this Edition. I have certainly enjoyed compiling it.

Graham Powell

## Contents

P.3 “A Simple Argument”, by P. Elauria	P.25 The Problem Page, by G. Powell
P.3 Two Poems by G. Powell	P.27 ‘Literary Terms’ Cartoons, by G. Powell
P.5 Psychological Considerations by J. Kalcic	P.29 M.L.King Jnr.’s Use of Rhetoric, by T. Kahn
P.6. Poem and 50-word stories by G. Powell	P.31 “Coached Salvation” Analysis, by G. Powell
P.8 Neoclassical Criticism Essay by T. Kahn	P.34 Essay on Ishmael Reed, by G. Powell
P.11 Coached Salvation poem by G. Powell	P.41 Gina and Early Scenes, by E. Trowbridge
P.12 Essay on Heidegger, by P. Edgeworth	P.43 The Problem Page Answers

### **A Simple Argument against at least one type of "God", by Phil Elauria.**

Here's a simple argument I came up with some time ago. I don't recall reading this anywhere else. It reminds me of the problem of evil argument.

- An omniscient God would know what it would take to convince me of its existence.
- An omnipotent God would be able to meet that criteria, whatever it is.
- If it is good to know God, a benevolent God would meet the demands of that criteria.
- I am not convinced of God's existence.

Therefore:

- God is not omniscient or
- God is not omnipotent or
- God isn't benevolent or
- It isn't good to know about God and thus all this hoopla about "saving" people is unwarranted or some combination of any of the above.

Just in case the argument about my "choice" to accept God (or the common apologetic response about free will) comes to mind:

Can you choose not to believe you're reading this question?

### **Two Poems by Graham Powell**

#### **Conception.**

Everyone stares at the vase  
behind the dark window pane,  
tall and slender:  
"It's the finest money can buy;"

and praise rains down from time to time  
as days and years go by;  
and the Creator beams  
at how much it holds:  
"It's more than most can see;"

And reasons exist for not having it,  
not placing it in their lives,  
it's so delicate, precious, so refined,  
it exposes the vision in people's eyes;  
and so it remains for all to admire,  
all to desire,  
till the light descends upon this world,  
and His warm lips  
re-moisten  
that solitary vessel.

**Picture of a Guru.**

Prone to your altar,  
the framed light of your smile  
spreads into the eyes of a follower;  
beyond,  
the light transcends the camera of the mind  
inscribing a Turin-shroud-like memory,  
permanent and holy.

The incense of your  
shampooed hair infuses the  
still-warm pillow in these arms;  
the doubters  
are suspended beyond this world,  
and our distance dissolves  
like the solitude.



### **Psychological Characteristics – Controversies, by Jugoslav Kalcic.**

Jugoslav Kalcic (51) is a member of the Triple Nine Society and quite an ordinary man. He lives in a cottage-colony near Skopje, the capital of the Republic of Macedonia (also known as FYROM).

For more than 19 years he's been unemployed. He's never been married, and probably never will be (though, as always, hope springs eternal). He's without children (as far as he knows). In the "distant past" he gained a number of excellent achievements in various fields of art, science and sports. His question is:

What are racism and xenophobia, essentially? Are these features of only 'selected' groups of people, are they more widespread, or are they ubiquitous?

First let us relate the expressions to each other: Racism is the original essence of xenophobia. Xenophobia is just a milder type of racism, and this should not be misunderstood. When your neighbours annoy you by playing loud music, by making other noises, or by some other peculiar behaviour (perhaps related to a different religion from yours) you might say:

"Ah, these Hispanic (Chinese, Arab, Black, Muslim, Catholic, etc. . . ) folks are annoying!"

Is this reaction to be expected?

"Yes. Folks are annoying!"

Is this reaction to be expected? Yes, definitely!

But, is it just about being annoyed, or are there (hidden deep within you) aversions and hostility towards other racial and / or religious groups? Is it just "innocent" xenophobia or is it really racism? (Is there an "innocent" xenophobia or perhaps even "innocent" racism? Is there an "innocent" dislike for any group of people? No!)

Racism and xenophobia are "normal" human features! There's no-one who does not know them! Everyone at certain times "expresses" these features. The question is, whether one is able to make their own decision to control this, in order that it does not become one's "major" feature. It is this power, the making one's own decisions to control these human traits, which constitutes "intelligence" – at least for me.

But how and when do people acquire these traits? From parents? From the street? At school? The environment in which they live? Friends? Genetic inheritance? No! Every man decides for himself what will be when he meets life!

An example: Two brothers live with their father (who is a trashy xenophobic nationalist). One brother goes along the line of least resistance, and becomes the picture of his father, practically a copy. The other brother decides to go for the opposite qualities, selecting humanity and goodness. Why do environment and education not equally affect these two children from the same father? Because every man decides which characteristics will dominate his or her being, keeping the opposite characteristics at bay!

Hundreds of sperm fight to fertilize an egg . Since only one sperm will win, all the others will die, and that fight is full of hatred. The winning sperm will be full of egotism, and the narcissism of this master sperm provides for racism and xenophobia. At the moment of the fertilisation of the egg, humanism arrives, since a human was created, not an animal. All the other features come from the next moment, including the atrocities. (There is no bigger beast than from man; animals kill for food, self-defence, defence of their offspring or as a consequence of pain resulting from injuries—man kills for a prank. He is really the most disgusting beast on the whole planet!)

Finally, are we racist, xenophobic or humane people? The answer is simple and ultimate: there's no place for "or"; it is "yes" to all three!



**Visitation From The West Wind, by Graham Powell**

I dreamed of you last night,  
I saw your face, unveiled of distress,  
wrapped in diaphanous splendour – Pre-Raphaelite,  
Orphelian – there to bless  
the soulful art of Millais.

The curls and gossamer dress  
streamed forth, then began to splay,  
and with a pale hand

I reached out,

but your image washed away.

And now as I gaze across the land  
at a Turner sky in red,  
the sun sinks down beneath the sand,  
and the wind sings to my head:

“Farewell, farewell,”

and I know that you are dead.



### 50-word Stories

#### The Angel.

There was a young girl who decided to take a photo of an angel she could see. She carefully lined up the shot, then 'click' went the camera; but immediately the girl felt a strange tingling sensation, the angel disappeared, and all that remained in the room was her mirror.

#### The Lesson.

The boy was confused:

"Carpe Diem – seize the day. Can you seize something you cannot touch?"

The man sighed:

"It means 'make the most of time,' like in the poem:

*For this same flower that smiles today, to-morrow will be .....*"

The boy looked at the prostrate man, and understood.

#### The Eponym.

Pleased at the prospect of creating something, she eased the pen from its case and set about placing the nib on the page. It had become a craze, a true ritual for the woman to write a poem, though the acrostic today was more of a story, than a poem.

*Neoclassical Criticism Method Applied to President Bush's GWII Ultimatum Speech.*

For the purposes of this essay, I will refer to President George W. Bush's war speech ("Ultimatum" televised on March, 17, 2003) as the "pre-GW II" speech, indicating "Gulf War Two." In addition, I will keep my remarks objective and leave out any personal political feelings I have regarding geopolitical power and diplomacy issues, and attempt, to the best of my ability, to maintain the tone of a fair cultural and literary critic in analyzing this work rhetorically with regard to the standards and criterion of the neoclassical method which is concerned with the persuasive nature of the message, in its technical and aesthetic dimensions.

What struck me initially, as a Teacher of English, was the language level of the speech itself. The diction and syntax are very accessible to a broad audience, and I'm sure Mr. Bush's speech ghostwriters did this intentionally to appeal to the broadest audience base possible. It appears to be at the 7th or 8th grade comprehension level at best, which is, in itself not a bad thing, since one of the goals of Aristotelian rhetorical appeals is to establish "links" with the audience. If the language level were too "high or alienating," it would not have an effective "utilitarian" value.

Generally, the piece is a well-constructed and persuasive speech of war rhetoric if we accept all of the premises to be true. As I mentioned before, I am not going to spend my time here debating the veracity of the claims, but for the sake of rhetorical analysis, accept them as true and offer my critique from that assumption. The speech's effect, overall, is that of a truism. Of course, if you are threatened, you ought to attack the ones threatening you. On a human level, it is obvious, but if we look at the speech in its construction, we can see the classic argument model and Campbell and Jamieson's "War Rhetoric" elements being exemplified.



The speech begins with the expression of impatience and frustration at Iraq's denial and thwarting of WMD inspections, paints Iraq as dangerous to the Middle East and the world, and goes on to predict that Iraq will use WMDs in terrorist attacks against the USA if it possesses them. This opening passage is an excellent use of and demonstration of both ethos and pathos. The ethos of Bush is established as one who is morally disgusted by Iraq's past transgressions and his pathos is exemplified by the dramatic statement "The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve this threat. But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety." As captain of the metaphorical "ship of state," Bush will "steer" us in the right direction, towards a path of safety.

As Campbell and Jamieson established "The rhetoric not only justifies the use of force but also seeks to legitimate presidential assumption of the extraordinary powers of the commander in chief...", and Bush represents and affirms this authority in declaring (p. 2) "The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security. That duty falls to me, as Commander-in Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep." Bush's argument is building to his ultimatum; he has thus far painted Iraq as an imminent threat and affirmed his authority to respond to it.

The speech goes on to build a case on why the US should, with the assistance of some allies, "skirt" the UN - "many nations do not have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace," and the United Nations Security Council because "it has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours. (p. 3). Having built up his case, Bush then demands that Saddam Hussein (and sons) leave Iraq within 48 hours. The speech goes on to establish more pathos in showing great concern not only for the safety of the people of the USA (against "retaliatory terrorism"), but also of "innocent"

Iraqis: "If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you."

All in all, from an objective neoclassical critique view, the pre-GWII speech is well-designed and executed. It builds a case and enriches it with moral, ethical, and passionate humanistic appeals which illustrate the persuasive techniques of the Aristotelian-based persuasion method. It establishes common values with the audience, appeals to their visceral fears and humanistic ideals and elicits the acceptance of its argument.

What intrigued me about this type of speech, unfortunately perhaps, is the timelessness of it. Essentially, the sophist Isocrates was making the same case thousands of years ago when he called on the Greek states to give hegemony to Athens, to unite, and to fight the Persians: "...the only benefit which we can reap from the wars we have waged against each other is by resolving the experiences which we have gained from them shall be employed against the barbarians ("Panegyricus" p. 231)." This is not far dissimilar to Bush's (ghostwriter's) "Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the violent. And tonight, as we have done before, America and our allies accept that responsibility." I suppose that, sadly, classic (war rhetoric) persuasive methods will be used as long as "classic" conflicts exist as well.

*Tahawar Khan, Ph.D.*



Coached Salvation

by Graham Powell

Through the glass barrier,  
a green freshness waves in the wind,  
Berkshire,  
quintessential England,  
the grassy strips passing towards  
a monument to law,  
justice, the equal rights of Man -  
Runnymede.  
Near the border to Surrey,  
a redolent beige interrupts the flow,  
cereal killing the hopefulness  
as shibboleths of wheat mystify  
with records of tired tracks within,  
wheat fields afar just chiaroscuro frames  
of previous movement,  
appearing like ploughed lands, not  
cultivated at all.  
Memories of scorched hills come back,  
clouding the windowed view,  
hazy reflections on a life left behind:  
"Ma chi se ne frega?"  
(Who gives a damn?)





## Heidegger's Uncovering of Truth- by Paul Edgeworth.

### 1. The Essence of Truth

Heidegger's notion of truth represents a new philosophical approach that is both imposing and compelling. Heidegger's entire approach to the issue of what constitutes truth is radically different from anything seen previously in Western philosophy, though he himself attributes his approach to the earliest phase in Greek thought, namely the pre-Socratic.<sup>1</sup>

What Heidegger is interested in is no less than the essence of truth. Our topic is the *essence* of truth. The question regarding the essence of truth is not concerned with whether truth is a truth of practical experience or of economic calculation, the truth of a technical consideration or of political sagacity, or, in particular, a truth of scientific research or of artistic composition, or even the truth of thoughtful reflection or of cultic belief. The question of essence disregards all this and attends to the one thing that in general distinguishes every "truth" as truth.<sup>2</sup>

Heidegger is trying to get beyond a day-to-day understanding of truth, that is, a common sense approach which takes truth for granted. Such a common sense approach is so familiar to us that we have difficulty in thinking of another way of interpreting truth. But Heidegger is keenly intent on recapturing the original meaning of truth, and in this regard he is insistent that the Greek term *al'theia* is indicative of its original and most telling meaning.<sup>3</sup> And the most literal meaning of *al'theia* for Heidegger is unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*), a bringing out or disclosure of things. It is pre-theoretical, pre-scientific; it is a primordial disclosedness. With this, the traditional domain of the problem of truth is abandoned, and the question now dwells in a domain that is strange to us because it is unfamiliar.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, what Heidegger is trying to do is to provide us with a notion of truth which would be widely acknowledged as independent of man, and that it is what it is, whether we like it or not.<sup>5</sup>

### 2. Truth as Correspondence

To grasp what Heidegger is saying in his notion of truth, it will be necessary for us to arrive at an understanding of the theory of truth as correspondence, as well as the related concepts of comportment, freedom, letting-be, history, untruth and erracy, in the pages that follow. In addition, we must also examine albeit briefly what Heidegger finds objectionable in Plato's notion of truth.

Heidegger begins his analysis from the common concept of truth, namely, truth in the sense of correspondence, and enquires into what is implied or presupposed in this concept of truth, that is to say, into what must be laid bare, so that we can be in a position to come to terms with this concept.<sup>6</sup> Though our starting point can be said to be a common sense understanding of truth, we shall quickly

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<sup>1</sup>D.A. Rohatyn, "An Introduction to Heidegger: Truth and Being," *Sapienza* 28 (1975): 213.

<sup>2</sup>Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," trans. John Sallis, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), 136.

<sup>3</sup>Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, with an intro. By Werner Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949), 129.

<sup>4</sup>Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study*, trans. J.L. Mehta (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 84.

<sup>5</sup>Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1987), 232.

<sup>6</sup>Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, 76.



find that we cannot be satisfied with it. Heidegger tells us that our ordinary concept of truth is such that the true is taken to be the actual. By way of example he tells us that we distinguish true gold from the false. But strangely what merely seems to be gold, is nonetheless actual. It is, in some sense, truly a false piece of gold. Wherever we suspect false gold, we say that something is not in accord; on the other hand, if something is as it should be, then we say that it is in accord, that is, it is a genuine piece of gold in accordance with the notion of real gold. Furthermore, Heidegger reminds us that we not only call genuine gold and all genuine things true, but likewise we call true our statements about these things. Thus it is just not only a state of affairs, but a proposition as well that is said to be in accord.<sup>7</sup>

Walter Biemel, by way of clarification, tells us that ordinarily we speak of a state of affairs as true, and this can be applied to human beings, their states or behavior, or to things such as the gold coin that Heidegger uses as an example. We seek first then to identify the true with the real, but when the gold coin turns out to be false, it still is also something real or else we could never have been exposed to the risk of being fooled by it. When we have a certain concept of a thing, and the thing corresponds with the concept, we then say that it is true, that is, that it is as it should be. Likewise, a statement is true when what it means and says agrees with the thing. Thus in the first instance it is the thing that is right, and in the second instance, it is the statement or proposition that is right.<sup>8</sup> Traditionally then, truth has been understood as the adequation of intellect and thing. The first of its variants may have been in the *Sophist*, 263b, and it recurs in many more variants.<sup>9</sup> In our time it has been distilled into the purest form by Alfred Tarski as the “semantic conception of truth,” whereby the sentence “p is true if and only if p” is taken to give the definition of the predicate “true,” that is to say, the sentence “snow is white” is true, “if and only if snow is white.”<sup>10</sup>

### 3. The Medieval Concept of Truth

The dual character of accord, Heidegger tells us, is brought to light by the traditional definition of truth: *veritas est adaequatio rei intellectus*.<sup>11</sup> This can mean that truth is the correspondence of the matter to knowledge, and that truth is the correspondence of knowledge to the matter. This, in turn, leads Heidegger to a consideration of the medieval concept of truth in which truth was linked to the creation of the world.

[W]ith respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created (*ens creatum*), is only insofar as it corresponds to the *idea* preconceived in the *intellectus divinis*, i.e., in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea (is correct) and in this sense is “true.” The *intellectus humanus* too is an *ens creatum*. As a capacity bestowed upon human beings by God, it must satisfy its *idea*. But the understanding measures up to the idea only by accomplishing in its propositions the correspondence of what is thought to the matter, which in its turn must be in conformity with the *idea*. If all beings are “created,” the possibility of the truth of human knowledge is grounded in the fact that matter and proposition measure up to the idea in the same way and therefore are fitted to each other on the basis of the unity of the divine plan of creation.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>“On the Essence of truth,” 137-38.

<sup>8</sup>Martin Heidegger, 77

<sup>9</sup>Graeme Nicholson, *Illustrations of Being: Drawing Upon Heidegger and Upon Metaphysics* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1992), 69.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.; Philip McShane, *A Brief History of Tongue: From Big Bang to Coloured Wholes* (Halifax: Axial Press, 1998), 59.

<sup>11</sup>“On the Essence of Truth,” 138.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 138-39.



Thus we can say that the things of the world were true to the extent they agreed with the divine intellect, that is, true gold was what agreed with the eternal idea of gold, and what did not agree was false gold; hence, a source of illusion to the mind of man.<sup>13</sup> Likewise, a statement could count as true only if the thing in question was stabilized by the absolute idea; in the absence of which, the human intellect could not correspond to it at all, or, if it were able to correspond, the state of the intellect would not be stable enough to count as truth.<sup>14</sup> The human intellect is created by God, and when it

attains a true belief regarding the created object, it achieves conformity with the divine idea; there is an adequation of human and divine intellect.<sup>15</sup> Therefore we can see that the human intellect has the task of being adequate to what is grounded in the divine intellect.

It is not Heidegger's concern to justify the medieval understanding of truth, rather he wants to show us how it was interpreted, and in so doing, direct our attention to the interesting fact that this interpretation of truth as adequation is retained even when the medieval position is abandoned.<sup>16</sup> From this, Werner Brock tells us, we can see that for Heidegger the conception of truth is always essentially related to the interpretation of the nature of all that exists, attempted in any age or historic era.<sup>17</sup> Brock also says that the reference to the historic setting is the first, albeit implicit, refutation of the theory that the seat of truth is in the proposition and its agreement with a thing.<sup>18</sup> One thing for sure, that is becoming increasingly evident, is that the problem of truth cannot be treated in isolation from a consideration of the nature of Being and of humanity.<sup>19</sup>

#### 4. Inadequacy of Truth as Correspondence

What Heidegger has sought in the foregoing is an accounting of how correspondence is possible. He is not saying that correspondence does not take place. Rather what he is saying is that as an account of truth, the correspondence theory is inadequate as it is incomplete. There is no statement of conditions as to how the correspondence itself is possible. Heidegger finds nowhere in tradition how these corresponding relations are possible. Even theological accounts do not explain adequately how correspondence is possible.

#### 5. Truth and Comportment

What Heidegger does next is to examine what is occurring between heterogeneous things, that is, between an assertion and the being to which it is related. Heidegger asks, "How is the statement able to correspond to something else, the thing, precisely by persisting in its own essence?"<sup>20</sup> What

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<sup>13</sup>Nicholson, 71.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, 79.

<sup>17</sup>Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, 136.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Nicholson, 71.

<sup>20</sup>"On the Essence of Truth," 140.

follows in Heidegger's thinking is very interesting indeed. He tells us that the essence of the correspondence is determined by the kind of relation that occurs between the statement and the thing. He then remarks:

As thus placed, what stands opposed must traverse an open field of opposedness [*Entgegen*] and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a thing and show itself as something withstanding [*ein Ständiges*]. This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an open region, the openness of which is not first created by presenting [that is, representation] but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness. The relation of the [re]presentative statement to the thing is the accomplishment of that *bearing* [*verhältnis*] that originarily, and always, comes to prevail as a comportment [*Verhalten*].<sup>21</sup>

What Heidegger is telling us is that a relationship between the representer and the represented thus comes about, which is conceived of as a comportment, attunement, or attitude.<sup>22</sup> It is comportment that stands open to beings, and every open relatedness is a comportment.<sup>23</sup> Only if the thing traverses this openness, that is, only if man and the thing are together in the openness can a correspondence between the thing and the statement occur. As Heidegger exclaims, "A statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for the presentative correspondence."<sup>24</sup> Truth is therefore to be understood from the viewpoint of the openness in which both the individual being and the man who comports with the being find themselves.<sup>25</sup> For an assertion to conform with a thing, the thing must be in the realm of the open, and the one who makes the assertion must also take his place in the same domain so that the thing in question may encounter him.<sup>26</sup>

## 6. Openness and Relatedness

What we find then is not an opening created by representation, but rather one taken over by a realm of relatedness. Comportment can be characterized as our being related to things or beings in this opening, and as such can take on many forms. All our particular relations such as working on something, all our calculations, etc., involve a fulfillment of Being in the opening of things, a sharing, so to speak, as the fundamental comportment. At this stage in his thought we are able to see that Heidegger is no longer interested in detailed analysis of the temporal, such as Care. And this is so, because Heidegger has come to realize that comportment is a granting, or giving of Being, rather than something that a human brings about. Thus we can see that the fundamental standing in the opening is now characterized by Heidegger as a giving or an event brought about by being itself. That humans stand in the openness of things is thus thought by Heidegger to be a super-subjective event.

## 7. Essence of Truth as Freedom

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 141.

<sup>22</sup>In the unpublished first version of "On the Essence of Truth," we find: " 'All 'relating' as such contains, as part of what it bestows, the inner mandate to get in tune with that to which the 'relating' holds itself in relation and how it holds itself toward it. The becoming attuned of this holding-in-relation, moreover, is an opening itself to that toward which it holds itself, and together with it, a being open to that of the 'relating' itself.' " See Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, 81.

<sup>23</sup>"On the Essence of Truth," 141.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 142.

<sup>25</sup>Walter Biemel, "Poetry and Language in Heidegger," *On Heidegger and Language*, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1972), 74.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

Heidegger can thus sum up his account of the conditions that lead to correspondence and say that truth is not originally at home in the proposition. If the correctness of a statement is only possible through the openness of comportment, then what first makes correctness possible must be taken as the essence of truth.<sup>27</sup> Heidegger is thus turning to a pre-propositional condition for truth—the openness of things. Things must accordingly already be open and available to us to make an assertion correspond. The openness of beings, because it precedes, is thus taken by Heidegger to be more primary. The availability of things can therefore be said to constitute the primary account of truth. We can therefore say that any commerce with a being is possible only insofar as it is drawn out of hiddenness and has become available to us as unhidden.<sup>28</sup> Correspondence theory neglects then the Greek notion of *al'theia* as the primary availability of things. But this, in turn, should not be construed as meaning that beings are necessarily objects for man as subject, but rather, beingness as an implicit referredness of beings to man, means the intelligible disclosure of beings, that is, their *al'theia*.<sup>29</sup>

To release oneself for the entity that is manifest is to be free towards what is manifest in the open; thus, the consideration of truth is given an unexpected turn by Heidegger, for now it becomes evident that the essence of truth is going to be freedom.<sup>30</sup> How then is the essence of freedom to be thought? Heidegger responds:

That which is opened up, that to which a presentative statement as correct corresponds, are beings opened up in an open comportment. Freedom for what is opened up in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be.<sup>31</sup>

The way to think of freedom as essential is then the “letting be” of beings which occurs in the human engagement with beings. That is to say, the letting be of beings—beings appearing as beings—can only occur for a being that has a capacity for a relationship with the whole of beings. The uncovering of what *is*, thus means that men would be, together with a multitude of other beings, in a world and in a whole, and that only when men have learned to treat things as they are would men emerge from a long-lasting enclosure into a wide-ranging overtness.<sup>32</sup>

## 8. Dasein as the Opening of a World

Obviously, the fundamental freedom, which here is the focus of thought, is not the free will of man; rather, what Heidegger is trying to describe is the fundamental engagement of Da-sein, which is to be seen as nothing other than the opening of a world, the root of the Da.<sup>33</sup> The term freedom is then rather a development of the notion of openness and can be understood by analogy with the spatial sense of free as “clear of ” or “open.”<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, Heidegger frequently speaks of a “clearing” (*Lichtung*) in the density of beings without which such clearing there could be no light (*Licht*), and it is

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<sup>27</sup>“On the Essence of Truth,” 142.

<sup>28</sup>Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, 25.

<sup>29</sup>Thomas Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Topic: Excess, Recess, Access,” *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 41 (1979): 621

<sup>30</sup>Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, 83.

<sup>31</sup>“On the Essence of Truth,” 144.

<sup>32</sup>*Existence and Being*, 151

<sup>33</sup>Thomas Langan, *The Meaning of Heidegger: A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), 132.


<sup>34</sup>W.B. Macomber, *The Anatomy of Disillusion: Martin Heidegger’s Notion of Truth* (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1967), 99



in this sense that the term free is being employed here.<sup>35</sup> It is important then to grasp that the human does not possess this freedom. On the contrary, the reverse is true. Freedom possesses the human. Man, accordingly, belongs to freedom as to the area of openness which he is, but which for that same reason does not stand at his disposal, for freedom here is a freedom of obligation, that is, man's freedom to be bound and directed by the beings he encounters.<sup>36</sup> Hence for Heidegger we see an abandonment of the anthropological. The human is possessed by something beyond the human. That is to say, action on the part of Being as free, possesses the human, rather than the human as free opening up the human. Thus Being is disclosing itself. But what characterizes freedom is found only in humans—a freedom in relation to things. The rest of the animal world is too bound up. But freedom is not just an attribute of the human, even though manifested only in the human. Again, it is not a quality that arises from the human. It is rather Being itself that is the source of this freedom.

## 9. Ek-sistent Dasein

The freedom enjoyed by Dasein separates him from the mass of Seienden, which separation, in turn, enables Dasein to comport himself in relation to the things that are.<sup>37</sup> Every comportment then that is transposed into the open is free, and freedom is the act whereby Dasein surpasses every particular being.<sup>38</sup> Dasein's surpassing is itself accomplished through ek-sistence. Freedom is to be thought of then as an exposure in that Dasein is ex-posed, it ek-sists, stands out into the disclosure of what is.<sup>39</sup> Ek-sistent Dasein thus lets beings be by contributing their possibilities of Being, and it does so because it is characterized as being disclosing and because the Being of beings is defined as disclosedness.<sup>40</sup>



As thus seen from the viewpoint of the essence of truth, freedom shows itself as the bringing out of beings into unconcealedness.<sup>41</sup> Such freedom would then be prior to all traditional notions of freedom, e.g., arbitrary or whimsical choice, absence of constraint, or being receptive to a demand or an ontic necessity.<sup>42</sup> It also

becomes evident that the locus of truth is not in the statement or judgment.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 98-99.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 99.

<sup>37</sup>Langan, 132.

<sup>38</sup>Michel Haar, *Heidegger and the Essence of Man*, trans. William McNeill (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1993), 124.

<sup>39</sup>Laszlo Versényi, *Heidegger, Being, and Truth* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1965), 87.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 88.

<sup>41</sup>Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy* (Pittsburg: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1965), 114.

<sup>42</sup>Haar, 124.

<sup>43</sup>Kockelmans, 114.

At this point, to comprehend more completely just what Heidegger is saying, it is necessary for us to unpack his extremely dense thought and to look at his notions of letting be, unconcealedness, and openness in greater detail (the latter, in particular, as it relates to history). These notions are integral to Heidegger's thought and are profoundly interlinked with each other and therefore at times not easy to address alone and apart.

## 10. Freedom as Letting Things Be

Freedom, Heidegger tells us, is freedom for what is opened up in an open region, and as such it lets beings be the beings they are. Thus freedom reveals itself as letting beings be.<sup>44</sup> Our ordinary sense of letting something be is to forego something, to disengage ourselves, to have nothing to do with it, not to touch it. Both in its denotative and connotative meaning, it carries along a sense of letting a thing alone, of renouncing it, or even of going beyond the indifferent, to outright neglect. But, as Heidegger sees it, what is required now on our part is an understanding of letting be that is quite the opposite of what is ordinarily understood and that is the unusual notion that "To let be is to engage one-self with beings."<sup>45</sup> Freedom as letting be is then the opposite of leaving them alone; it implies a commitment and involvement with what is, and is an entrée into a realm of disclosure in which whatever is can be, that is, disclosed as such, as a phenomenon.<sup>46</sup> Heidegger is maintaining then that Dasein essentially lets beings be what and as they are.<sup>47</sup> Dasein does this by constituting the area of openness in which beings can attain to identity and autonomy; therefore, such an area of openness makes possible the "what" and the "as," so that it is only here that a being can be "what it is" and "as it is."<sup>48</sup> Letting be consists then in Dasein's placing itself in the openness of the open, that is, *al'theia*.<sup>49</sup> Heidegger tells us, "All human comportment and bearing are exposed in its [*al'theia*] open region."<sup>50</sup> Letting be is then not a mere disengagement with beings, but is rather an active attunement to beings-as-a-whole, and knowledge of Being, in turn, necessarily involves an attunement to the openness of beings.<sup>51</sup> When Dasein therefore achieves this attunement, beings-as-a-whole are made manifest, which is something quite distinct from being aware of the whatness of the sum total of known beings.<sup>52</sup>

## 11. *Al'theia* as the Most Important Term in Heidegger's Thought

It is now appropriate that we focus our attention upon unconcealment so as to garnish what insights we can from Heidegger's thought upon this ancient and largely forgotten notion. In this regard, Heidegger proclaims:

To let be - that is, to let beings be as the beings that they are - means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, with itself. Western thinking in its beginning conceived this open region as *ἀ-λήθεια*, the unconcealed. If we translate *ἀλήθεια* as "unconcealment" rather than "truth," this

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<sup>44</sup>"On the Essence of Truth," 144.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Versényi, 87.

<sup>47</sup>Macomber, 102.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Haar, 24.

<sup>50</sup>"On the Essence of Truth," 146.

<sup>51</sup>Niels Ole Alderman, "Heidegger and the Overthrow of Philosophy" (Ph. D. diss., Tulane University, 1967), 209.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

translation is not merely “more literal”; it contains the directive to . . . think it back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings.<sup>53</sup>

If we refer back to the correspondence theory of truth, we remember that before a statement can be matched with a state of affairs, something must first show itself in a process of emergence out of concealment.<sup>54</sup> Lawrence Hatab believes that the notion of unconcealment found in the Greek word is the most important term in all of Heidegger’s thought, for it gathers and effectively expresses what Heidegger was searching for from the very beginning of his inquiry, and that is, that the Being of beings is not reducible to any state of beings.<sup>55</sup> Just as in the English language, the phrase “the moment of truth” does not itself connote correspondence or correctness or for that matter even any vague conception of a ground for knowledge, but rather simply a situation in which there is an uncertain anticipation of an important correspondence, so too Hatab points out that the word truth itself may show a connection with unconcealment in terms of the disclosure process and thereby contemplate a nonfoundational emergence prior to correctness.<sup>56</sup> Thus given the implicit pluralism of unconcealment, Hatab ruminates, that the word truth can conceivably work in areas that have to do with a coming-forth rather than with correctness, one such example being art.<sup>57</sup>

Unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) is the bringing out of forgetting,<sup>58</sup> and this is perhaps the most literal rendering of *al’theia*. What is then essentially operative in the term *al’theia* is *l’th’* itself, even though it can be seen that this *l’th’*-dimension recedes in favor of beings which have become manifest.<sup>59</sup> The earliest Greek thinkers, experienced Being as nature or physics, that is, what arises out of itself and becomes unconcealed, and therefore as truth which Heidegger characterizes for us not as correspondence or *adequatio*, but as unconcealment.<sup>60</sup> Truth then can be understood as, in a sense, wrested out of concealment which is equiprimordial with it, if not even more primordial; accordingly, these two, that is, unconcealment and concealment, are always together, for one cannot be without the other.<sup>61</sup> Indeed, it is appropriate to think that if there were only concealment, all would remain in an undifferentiated darkness, and if there were only unconcealment, all would be cut off from any generative source.<sup>62</sup> The term unconcealedness is therefore meant to demonstrate that all that is open originates in concealedness and as such remains tied to it as the domain which holds unto itself, in the mode of withdrawal, that which may always not only remain hidden from Dasein but which may also eventually arrive in unhiddenness to Dasein as well.<sup>63</sup> The foregoing should now lead us to confront, perhaps for the first time, that no grasp of being is ever perfect, for something is always concealed

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<sup>53</sup>“On the Essence of Truth,” 144.

<sup>54</sup>Lawrence J. Hatab, “Rejoining *Al’theia* and Truth: Or Truth is a Five Letter Word,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (1990): 431.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 433.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 433-34.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, 435.

<sup>58</sup>We are reminded, of course, of the river of *l’th’*, i.e., the river of forgetfulness in Greek mythology.

<sup>59</sup>Sheehan, 634.

<sup>60</sup>Joan Stambaugh, *Thoughts on Heidegger* (Lanham, MD.: Univ. Press of America, 1991), 10.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup>Werner Marx, “The World in Another beginning: Poetic Dwelling and the Role of the Poet,” *On Heidegger and Language*, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1972), 238-39.

from us.<sup>64</sup> At the same time, none of this should appear to be new, for what Heidegger is, in effect, doing is but bringing to our attention again the necessity for a pre-ontological understanding of Being before we do commerce with beings themselves.<sup>65</sup> Once again, this makes clear that the source of the open as unconcealment is Being itself. To reiterate then, *al'theia* for Heidegger is truth in the sense of unconcealment.<sup>66</sup> When truth is understood in this manner, man is then only the locus of truth, for the ultimate foundation of truth is Being.<sup>67</sup> The only thing of importance then, according to Heidegger, is whether Being itself from its own truth is able to bring about a relation to the essence of man by which man himself is brought within the domain of Being itself.<sup>68</sup> Thus, in its self-concealment and withdrawal, and in its letting loose into unconcealment and beings, Being remains in relation to us and is indeed a letting loose of itself as well to us.<sup>69</sup> Truth as unconcealment allows us then to speak of truth in a primary way as simply "given."<sup>70</sup> This is another way of saying that a primary assumption is simply disclosed in the midst of concealment; thereby, *al'thic* truth results in a positive transformation of what would be considered a flaw by traditional accounts.<sup>71</sup>

## 12. History as the Evolution of Openness

We have already discussed openness to some extent, but it behooves us to shed additional light on this notion, as it relates to history, in order to appreciate more keenly what Heidegger is bringing to our attention. Openness is not to be viewed as a pure clearing in which what was once dark becomes brighter and brighter leading to some eventual maximum brightness, but as a medium that at each time lets certain traits come to the fore so that the being is able to show itself according to the openness that has been achieved; hence, the openness is subject to change, and the openness of ancient Greek thought is different from the openness of the medieval viewpoint, and, in turn, from that of the modern epoch.<sup>72</sup>

For Heidegger, history is to be understood as the evolution of the area of openness in which man confronts beings in such a manner as to allow them to influence his own being decisively.<sup>73</sup> Juxtaposed to this, we are also to understand that the meaning of Being is truth as unconcealment whose coming into being is historical in a sense that cannot be understood from what we have come to know traditionally as history.<sup>74</sup> Olafson provides interesting methodological insight into what Heidegger is attempting to accomplish in his accounting of history. He tells us, for instance, that Heidegger devotes a great deal of attention to the different understandings of truth expressed in the Greek word *al'theia* and in those that replaced it, e.g., *homoiosis* ("likeness" or "becoming like") and the Roman *veritas*. These successor terms to *al'theia* were meant to preserve equivalence but in the opinion of Heidegger failed to do so. Ordinarily, this is taken to mean that a person has used the word

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<sup>64</sup> Alderman, 207.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 208.

<sup>66</sup> Manfred S. Frings, "Protagoras Re-discovered: Heidegger's Explication of Protagoras' Fragment," *Journal of Value Inquiry* 8 (1974): 118.

<sup>67</sup> Kockelmans, 163.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Stambaugh, 147.

<sup>70</sup> Hatab, 436

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 441-42.


<sup>72</sup> Biemel, "Poetry and Language in Heidegger," 74.

<sup>73</sup> Macomber, 132.

<sup>74</sup> Otto Pöggeler, "Heidegger's Topology of Being," *On Heidegger and Language*, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1972), 123.



in a way that is mistaken. But Heidegger is not willing to treat such an erroneous rendering as simply a mistake of an historical individual. Rather, in his view, history is the manifestation of a sequence of shifts that Being itself brings about, and not the historical thinkers whose names may be associated with a particular term or word. That is to say, if such an individual thinker has mistranslated, so to speak, a term like *al'theia*, it is because Being, and therefore truth, has disclosed itself to him, and to his era, differently. Thus again we are being told to abandon our subject-influenced ways of understanding.<sup>75</sup> In effect, what Heidegger is telling us is that there is no eternal truth, existing in itself, awaiting discovery, but rather that truth is continually being created, and its possibilities are forever being renewed and are never exhausted.<sup>76</sup> What Heidegger wants us to



understand, therefore, is that the horizon of history is the horizon of possible interpretations of “what is,” in which the interpretation given at any particular time, that is to say the prevailing epochal understanding, constitutes the basis for the entire behavior of Dasein.<sup>77</sup> “The rare and the simple decisions of history arise from the way the originary essence of truth essentially unfolds.”<sup>78</sup>

### 13. Untruth Arises from the Essence of Truth

Coincident with shift of emphasis in the definition of truth, the nature of untruth also changes.<sup>79</sup> Untruth must arise from the essence of truth itself and not from human negligence or incapacity. As stated by Heidegger, “Considered with respect to truth as disclosedness, concealment is then un-disclosedness and accordingly the un-truth that is most proper to the essence of truth.”<sup>80</sup> Disclosure can thus only take place on the basis of concealedness. That is to say, every disclosure is finite, because it is intertwined with non-disclosure.<sup>81</sup> In letting be, we have a simultaneous occurring that is a yielding to “what is” at the moment, and a concealment of “what is as a whole.”<sup>82</sup> The letting be brings into openness the multitude of beings in the whole as what they are, but the letting be also at the same time preserves the older state of concealment of the beings that are in the whole.<sup>83</sup> According to Heidegger then, this represents the legitimate nature of untruth, that is, of the not-yet and never whole truth.<sup>84</sup> Thus Heidegger does not place untruth, as Descartes does, at the periphery of truth, but rather at its center, for untruth is not simply where truth leaves off, but the source out of

<sup>75</sup>Olafson, 202-3.

<sup>76</sup>Langan, 134.

<sup>77</sup>Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, 86.

<sup>78</sup>“On the Essence of Truth,” 146.

<sup>79</sup>Versényi, 89.

<sup>80</sup>“On the Essence of Truth,” 148.

<sup>81</sup>Nicolson, 80.

<sup>82</sup>Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, 88.

<sup>83</sup>*Existence and Being*, 160.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*, 160-61.

which it arises.<sup>85</sup> Heidegger also calls this form of untruth in an exceptional sense, the truth of Being in contrast to the truth of beings, and this is what he understands by the ontological difference.<sup>86</sup>

#### 14. Error Distinguished from Untruth

Besides the untruth which we have seen precedes openness, there is also another form of untruth which accompanies it, and which we call error.<sup>87</sup> Thus we can see that untruth is not synonymous with error in Heidegger's usage.<sup>88</sup> Erring occurs, for Heidegger, when we are so captivated by the thing that is revealed, that the mystery of concealedness itself lapses into oblivion.<sup>89</sup> Dasein is as insistent sticks obstinately to what is directly presented to it by an entity, and accordingly resists any attempt to inquire into that which renders all disclosure possible.<sup>90</sup> "The human being's flight from the mystery toward what is readily available, onward from one current thing to the next, passing the mystery by—this is *erring*."<sup>91</sup> Dasein, characterized by "falling," lost in the "they," and interpreting its own being on the basis of the objectivity of objects, is erring, and in this erring, the original truth-untruth tension of original disclosure and concealment, have become long forgotten and concealed.<sup>92</sup> This is the reason why truth degenerates to adequation and correctness, and untruth becomes inadequation and incorrectness of knowledge.<sup>93</sup>

#### 15. Heidegger and Plato

Before concluding our discussion of truth as unconcealment, it would be remiss on our part, if we did not say at least a few words on Heidegger's relationship with Plato. This relationship can be garnered from his essay entitled, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth."<sup>94</sup> Heidegger believes that one of the crucial moments in all of the Western tradition took place in the thought of Plato, particularly in Book VII of the *Republic* in the allegory of the cave.<sup>95</sup> As we have seen, Heidegger has characterized Being in terms of the truth of Being, which, in turn, we have come to see as *al'theia*, that is, disclosure or unconcealedness. In the present essay, he sees this disclosure being overlaid by an emphasis on idea or concept. In Heidegger's opinion, idea has become the mistress of truth, dominating truth, and thus obscuring the sense of *al'theia*.

"What remains unsaid in Plato's thinking is a change in what determines the essence of truth."<sup>96</sup> Heidegger does not doubt that Plato, in his account of *paideia*, deals with that which is disclosed, but what dismays him is that Plato's account is only instrumental to something else which is that disclosure is only important because it lays the appearance (*eidos*) of what appears, the form

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<sup>85</sup>Macomber, 107

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 108.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., 106.

<sup>89</sup>Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, 88.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., 89.

<sup>91</sup>"On the Essence of Truth," 150.

<sup>92</sup>Versényi, 90.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Trans. Thomas Sheehan, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).

<sup>95</sup>Thomas A. Fay, "Heidegger: The Origin and Development of Symbolic Logic," *Kant-Studien* 69 (1978): 444.

<sup>96</sup>"Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 155.

(idea) of what is seen, open to sight.<sup>97</sup> Truth in Plato is therefore thought by Heidegger to have degenerated.

Thinking goes . . . “beyond” those things that are experienced in the form of mere shadows and images [in the allegory of the cave], and goes . . . “out toward” these things, namely, the “ideas.” These are the suprasensuous, seen with a nonsensuous gaze; they are the being of beings, which cannot be grasped with our bodily organs. And the highest in the region of the suprasensuous is that idea which, as the idea of all ideas, remains the cause of the subsistence and the appearing of all beings. Because this “idea” is thereby the cause of everything, it is also “the idea” that is called “the good.”<sup>98</sup>

Heidegger believes that by making the idea of the good the ground of all disclosure, Plato subordinated truth to the idea and weakened the original character of truth.<sup>99</sup> Henceforth, the standard of truth will be agreement between perceiving and the thing perceived, and truth thus becomes a correctness of vision, a correspondence of seeing with the thing beheld, and a correctness of statement about it.<sup>100</sup> Truth is accordingly changed from unhiddenness to correctness (*orthotes*),<sup>101</sup> from a feature of being to a feature of knowing; hence, the human sphere. Heidegger characterizes this development in thought as a turn toward humanism. Metaphysics is characterized by Heidegger as humanistic, as founded by Plato and further developed by Aristotle. We have now before us a contrast in the truth of Being and the truth of the merely human that is grounded in human knowing. What follows upon this then is a prominence of the human and a subsequent eclipsing of trans-human Being by humans. For Heidegger, there is then in Plato one type of thinking which is genuinely Greek, plus another one departing from it, and overcoming what is genuinely Greek, in effect, is a kind of humanistic enlightenment. To interpret truth in this manner is to make man the criterion of all truth and Being.<sup>102</sup> Consequently, Aristotle, Aquinas, and indeed all of Western metaphysics was affected (if not infected) by this development in Plato.



## 16. Truth and the Road to Being

In conclusion, we can say that for Heidegger, all disclosedness of Being is inherently self-hiding, and the best way then to understand what truth is, is a literal translation of *al'theia* as a coming out of concealedness. The notion of the uncovering of truth that we find in Heidegger, aims at and

<sup>97</sup>Versényi, 57.

<sup>98</sup>“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” 180.

<sup>99</sup>Versényi, 58.

<sup>100</sup>Fay, 445.

<sup>101</sup>In fairness, we should point out that Heidegger engages in a certain impoverishing of Platonic thinking. The full depth of Plato’s approach does not come through in Heidegger’s portrayal. There is no recognition on Heidegger’s part that Plato is consciously employing a certain ambiguity in his allegory of the cave, which would arise from the perceived tension existing between the philosophical life and the political life. Since Heidegger does not acknowledge this conscious employment of ambiguity by Plato, it appears that he is saying no such tension occurs in the deepest thinking of thought (and least we forget, thought replaces philosophy for Heidegger).

<sup>102</sup>Versényi, 59.

carries with it, a fundamental change in the whole domain of philosophic truth.<sup>103</sup> As we have seen Heidegger's thought starts out from a discussion of the generally accepted notion of truth as correspondence or adequation, and leads later to an insight that truth is inseparably bound up with Dasein in its historic manifestation. Truth as *al'theia* is then an uncovering, but an uncovering of what? Of Being, but not of any old being, and as Heidegger has taken pains to emphasize certainly not of human being, but rather of Being in general.<sup>104</sup> But Being inherently hides itself, and so it is difficult to turn toward Being. The concealing of Being is inseparable from Being, and its concealing is its fundamental mystery. But we know at least at this point that the road to any knowledge of Being must arise from a reflection on the origin and essence of truth.<sup>105</sup> Although we can state with some degree of certainty that there is a sense of disillusion on Heidegger's part with what has occurred in the Western tradition, we can also exclaim with even greater certitude that Heidegger's thinking on these matters has enabled us to increase immeasurably our understanding of truth and its relationship to Being. Nor should we think that the entire Western metaphysical tradition has simply been misguided. It is still one of humankind's most rewarding accomplishments, and, as brought to our attention in Heidegger's thought, can be seen to have occurred in the space that exists between beings and Being. Heidegger has thus illuminated the difference we want to understand in a most striking and interesting way. It therefore accrues to our benefit to pay significant attention to what he has to say to us.



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<sup>103</sup>*Existence and Being*, 133.

<sup>104</sup>Rohatyn, 214.

<sup>105</sup>Kockelmans, 165.



20 8 5 16 18 15 2 12 5 13 16 1 7 5.

1) **23 8 9 3 8 3 15 21 14 20 18 25 9 19 9 20? 5 14 7 12 1 14 4.**

2) **Start from an outside number. Using multiplication, division, addition and subtraction (in turn) on the outside numbers, try to get the resultant highlighted number in the middle, using each outside number only once.**

**Can you solve it by starting from different numbers?**

5  
6     3     14  
9    11

3) General Knowledge Crossword.

1		2		3			4	5	6
						7			
						8			
	9			10	11			12	
13		14	15		16		17		
18	19			20		21			
22			23				24		
25		26							27
28					29				
30				31					

**Across**

1. Now known as Mumbai.
4. Precious stone.
7. Pole or post in Italian.
8. One of Job's masterpieces.
9. Informal greeting.
10. A friendly DVD format.
12. Voluntary soldier says thanks.
14. God's year.
16. A tag.
18. 'Lamb' in Latin.
21. Study Gods in this lesson.
22. An auxiliary verb in English.
23. The Beatles' cleaning implement?
24. One indefinite article in English.
25. Dull.
28. Greek prefix meaning 'wine'.
30. Total produced by a country.
31. The answer to question 3 in the quiz below said, if you were tired of this, you were tired of life.

**Down**

1. Name of a funny Hope.
2. Average.
3. Half a shocking rock group.
4. A space between.
5. To make happy. (Verb)
6. 'Can' & 'must' are these types of verb.
7. Portuguese support for a village in Goa?
11. Paul Simon says you can call me this.
13. Crazy animal.
15. Famous elephant.
17. Hair with small wooden pieces. (Adjective)
19. Punctured by a bull.
20. Sounds like the 'Dominant' note in a scale?
26. Initials of a Chadian political force, 1960-61.
27. Put your waste here.
29. A preposition in English.

**Quiz.**

- 1) *What was the surname of the French naval leader at the Battle of Trafalgar?*
- 2) *What happened in Oxford in 1209 that caused scholars to flee to Cambridge?*
- 3) *Who said: "Sir, you have two topics, yourself and me. I am sick of both"?*
- 4) *What and where is Niue?*
- 5) *According to Maria Blasco, short telomeres are an indication of what?*

## Literary Terms....

Prof.  
Gee.



"My love is  
like a red, red  
rose"



Do you like  
the metaphor?



Actually,  
it's a  
Simile!



A Simile  
is 'like' or  
'as' something  
else....



But a metaphor  
is something else!



So, a simile is like  
a suppository, but  
a metaphor is a  
pain in the bum!



Umm, something  
like that.

Anyway,  
that's  
'Pig-pen'  
over  
there!



And  
that's a  
metonym!



A 'metonymy?'

What?

"Pig-pen?"



Yes, a name that  
associates one thing  
with something different.



Still stinks,  
though!

Two days later in America...

Hey, I've got  
a head for  
heights!



Wow! Cowboy,  
you've just used  
a synecdoche!

A part of something  
which represents the  
whole-----

You ol'  
big head!



No, you're the  
big-head!



Yep! The biggest  
in Christendom!



That's  
hyperbole.



Yep!! I'm the best at  
that too!!



Umm.



Maybe I  
was wrong  
about the  
over-  
statement!

G.P.

### **Aristotle's "Topics of Argument" and Elements of Style in King's "Letter from Birmingham Jail".**

Martin Luther King Junior's "Letter from Birmingham Jail" is a logical and impassioned appeal for changing attitudes about racial segregation and discrimination. King gears his style to his audience, Christian ministers and clergymen. The style of the letter is middle to high, usually leaning to high. King's audience, men of high religious convictions and moral principles, would likely be moved by his flowing style and sense of social and ethical urgency.

While confined in jail, King composed the letter to address why he is in jail and to tackle some of the looming problems on the racial-political horizon. He employs several of the logical appeals espoused by Aristotle to add a sense of logos to his case. Sentence structures add style to substance in the letter; logical argument blends with stylistic cadence.

King begins with an appeal to logic. In paragraph 3 he states: "I am in Birmingham because injustice is here." He follows up that statement in paragraph 5 in which he says, "I am sure that none of you would want to rest content with the superficial kind of social analysis that deals merely with effects and does not grapple with underlying causes."

Here King utilizes one of Aristotle's antecedent-consequence topics, one of the cause-effect relationship. King goes on to say that demonstrations are unfortunate, but that they are the effect of the cause of white power structure domination and suppression. He employs Aristotle's principle by establishing that if the cause is present, the effect will also be present.

King argues from precedent in paragraph 11 when he compares current social tensions to the intellectual tension created by Socrates: "Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood."

King asserts that the "good" intellectual tension created by Socrates acts as an historical precedent and example for the "good," nonviolent, social and moral tension created by the anti-prejudice demonstrators. The structural parallelism of the sentence is aesthetically appealing; it illustrates the similarity of tensions syntactically. References to the ideals of Socrates identify King as a learned and sensitive person and flatters his audience by assuming they also know of the actions and ideals of Socrates.

King continues his logical appeals for racial equality by referring to past fact in paragraph 15 when he asserts: "We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed." He employs Aristotle's idea that if someone has the power, the desire, the opportunity to do something, then he/she has done it. King raises the idea without referencing specific historical examples; he perceives his audience as being well educated enough to provide their own examples of the principle such as the French Revolution, the American War of Independence, or India's rise against the British Raj.

In paragraph 16, we see an example of a highly stylized and passionate sentence. King follows up the idea that freedom must be demanded by the oppressed by using climax at the end of the sentence to back up all the anaphoric examples illustrated in the body of the sentence. Ten phrases begin with "when" and provide a dramatic tempo for the emotional examples given in the



sentence. The word “Then” indicates an end to the list of examples of racial atrocities and brings the sentence to a climax.

True to the Ciceronian ideals of blending style and substance, King goes back to Aristotelian logic after his emotional appeal. A syllogism is inherent in the structure of paragraph 18. If we take the statement: “any law that uplifts human personality is just; any law that degrades human personality is unjust” as the major premise, and the passage: “all segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality” as the minor premise, then the assertion “hence segregation is not only politically, economically, and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and sinful” logically follows as the conclusion of the Aristotelian syllogism. King employs a format of formal logic to illustrate the moral decadence of segregation.

In paragraph 27, King cautions his critics not to condemn his violence-precipitating actions, lest they deny the antecedent which leads to the actions. He utilizes Aristotle’s antecedent-consequence inferential pattern: when a particular situation exists, it will give rise to a particular consequence. King states, “In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn’t this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn’t this like condemning Jesus because his unique God-consciousness and never-ceasing devotion to God’s will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion?” King urges his audience not to condemn his protests because they are “just” expressions of a people against an evil antecedent, segregationist laws. King’s reference to Jesus is a brilliant stroke to appeal to the emotions and logic of the clergymen reading his letter.

King blends aesthetic sentence style techniques with formal Aristotelian logic in paragraph 33. He states that he is no longer happy with being labeled as an “extremist” because of all the moral agents and creators of social change who were labeled extremists before him. His position is an argument from precedent: “Was not Jesus an extremist...Was not Amos an Extremist...Was not Paul an extremist...Was not Martin Luther an extremist...And John Bunyan...And Abraham Lincoln...And Thomas Jefferson” – all are historical models of “creative extremists.” Along with the logic of argument from precedent, is the stylistic effect of anaphora, paradigm, and rhetorical questions. King hits the mark again, appeals to the religious morality of his audience by referring to the “extremism” of Jesus, Amos, Paul, and Martin Luther.

Close to the end of the letter, in paragraph 45, King demonstrates one of Aristotle’s topics of the greater and the smaller. On page 70 of On Rhetoric, Aristotle claims: “And virtue is a greater thing than non-virtue.” King uses this principle to praise the morally upright Christians who support the civil rights movement: “But they have acted in the faith that right defeated is stronger than evil triumphant. Their witness has been the spiritual salt that has preserved the true meaning of the gospel in these troubled times. They have carved out a tunnel of hope through the dark mountains of disappointment.”

The closing paragraph of the letter, no. 52, begins with “I hope this letter finds you strong in the faith.” The sentence epitomizes King’s utilization of kairos, or situational appropriateness. He developed his letter with strong logical arguments, elements of middle and grand style in the sentence structure, and a clear awareness of the moral-religious focus of his clergymen audience.

Tahawar Kahn, PhD.

## **Coached Salvation: An Analysis of a Poem by Graham Powell**

The opening line mentions a 'glass barrier', the initial indication that the word 'coached' in the title refers to a vehicle. The perspective of the poem is from within a coach as the poet looks out of the window. This is reiterated in line 19: "clouding the windowed view", and it recounts an experience the poet had while returning to Englefield Green, Surrey, in July 2011, after visiting Windsor Castle in Berkshire. Windsor Castle is the oldest inhabited castle in the world, and a symbol of England's near thousand years of continuous monarchy, a country unconquered since the Battle of Senlac Hill on 14<sup>th</sup> October 1066.

Furthermore, the majority of the fields in Berkshire, and in the adjacent county of Surrey were verdant in July 2011 because several showers had refreshed the grass into a luscious green colour. Yet, suddenly the greenness was interrupted by a field of wheat, one so close that the ears of the cereal stood out, like a beige carpet. The previous day the poet had visited the green fields around Kingswood Hall named Runnymede, where the Magna Carta was signed by King John I in 1215. Though largely based on previously written laws, and subsequently ignored by the king who signed it, the Magna Carta none-the-less marks a turning point in the perceived relationship between the ruling monarch, the aristocrats and the commoners, especially the Barons who were charged with overseeing the management of the Manors (the areas of land which collectively made up what became Britain); above all, however, the Barons were responsible for supplying men to fight in the king's near ruinous military campaigns abroad.

As per medieval times, the fields in Berkshire and Surrey are still arranged in strips; but now they are most commonly delineated by hedges. From the poet's perspective, the fields were flashing past like green-framed pictures until the colour change to beige, something redolent because it brought back memories of the colour predominant in Sardinia during the summer, a place where the poet had recently seen the greenness being scorched to various shades of brown. Line 10 mentions 'the flow', this referring to the flow of thoughts about the 'hopefulness' mentioned in line 11, and due to the poet believing that he was in a more just society than before, the recent memories of Windsor Castle also reaffirming the sense of state stability.

Each passing strip of green field also took the coach nearer Runnymede, soon to be visible high on the hill as the poet approached Englefield Green. This is a village close to the border between Surrey and Berkshire, and the play on words "cereal killing" refers to the wheat field in view interrupting the thoughts on justice – 'killing' them. The word 'shibboleth' is also a play on words, the origin of this word meaning 'ear', as in 'the ear of a cereal', in this case, wheat. The ears of wheat are 'mystifying' as the poet looks afar because he can still see the tyre tracks within the crop, the very distant ones appearing like ploughed fields as the wheat shafts merge into 'chiaroscuro frames'. The poet uses the word 'tired' to imply fatigue, hard labour having produced the wheat field, even if it doesn't look cultivated from a distant point of view. This lack of cultivation is a reference to the lack of culture perceived in Sardinia, where life is seen as basic and often not very sophisticated. The word 'cultivated' also interrupts the rhythm of the previous line:

"appearing like ploughed lands,"

Introducing a hammer-like four beats after the word 'not'. Again, the 'flow' is interjected, the sun reflecting on the window making the view 'hazy', the visual cut-off also making the poet think about the island he's recently left behind.

Additionally, 'Shibboleth' has the modern meaning of 'a body of outdated knowledge that is, none-the-less, still adhered to', the British, in general, still respecting the law as represented by the Magna Carta. Nowadays only three articles of the 1297 draft of the document remain on the statute books, the most significant for the poem being the right of every free man to be tried under the law. In this sense, Lord Denning's comment that the Magna Carta is:

"...the greatest constitutional document of all times – the foundation of the freedom of the individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot," is apposite. <sup>(1)</sup>

Such a grandiose statement is also in contrast to the penultimate line of the poem:

"Ma chi se ne frega?" – translated in the final parenthesis as:

"Who gives a damn?"

This is the language of the street, commonly said when a person doesn't care much about the thing being moaned about, which frequently concerns injustice towards a person. In Italy, the sense of the law often revolves around "if it is okay for me, it's okay." If you don't agree, well, who else does? (Who gives a damn?) Stop moaning and get on with making the best of things for yourself, and if you can skirt the law, well, do it, everyone else does. Clearly this is a gross generalization, but the poet is making the point that the mere idea of infringing the law to suit your own purposes doesn't usually rest easily on British consciences.

As for the structure of the poem, it is composed of various lengths of line which have many sub-clauses, ones that break up the discourse of only three sentences with numerous asides within commas and one dash. The parenthesis at the end is merely a translation of the Italian phrase in inverted commas. The rhythm of the poem is also inconsistent, often reflecting side comments by the poet on the description of the wheat field, enunciating thoughts that take the poet away from his immediate surroundings:

"Memories of scorched hills come back," (Line 18), being an example.

The use of phrases running on from one line to the next weaves the reader through the poem, much like the poet's vision of the scenery moving from one point to the next, examples of enjambment occurring both before and after the phrase quoted at the end of the previous page:

"wheat fields afar just chiaroscuro frames

of previous movement,

appearing like ploughed lands, not

cultivated at all."

The second example of enjambment moves the stress of the line onto the first syllable of 'cultivated', emphasizing it strongly. This line makes reference to Sardinian culture, which is rich and ancient, but is not cultivated much in modern Italy. As previously stated, Sardinians are often represented by the media as mere farmers or shepherds who are rough and not sophisticated, a misrepresentation and generalization that in many ways exemplifies the Italian media's preoccupation with low culture.

As for the use of alliteration, the repetition of the 'w' in the second line, and which appears on the third and fourth foot of the line, results in the rhythm falling heavily on the one word in the third line: 'Berkshire,' thereby emphasizing the identification of place in the poem. Further examples of alliteration are 'tired tracks' and 'life left'.

In brief, then, the poem is an idealized view of two cultures as inspired by a chance encounter during a journey in a familiar land, yet far from the poet's home.



(1) Quoted in Danny Danziger & John Gillingham, "1215: The Year of Magna Carta"(2004 paperback edition) p278



## Ishmael Reed's Use of Parody in 'The Last Days of Louisiana Red'

By

Graham Powell, based on a thesis by Dr. Elisabetta Basciu.

### **Preamble.**

This is the second part of the essay which appears in the 6<sup>th</sup> publication of the WIN ONE. The first part deals with the development of a distinctive Afro-American voice within some previously dominant White American or Eurocentric literary genres, and the use of various literary devices to reflect that voice; however, Ishmael Reed wishes to take this development further, especially via the use of a Hoodoo Aesthetic, syncretism and, in particular, the act of signifying, which he uses to parody an ancient Greek literary text in The Last Days of Louisiana Red.

### **1) "Signifying" as Parody.**

The vernacular Afro-American tradition gives great importance to the use of rhetoric and semantics, a dual role during discourse which Afro-Americans have named "Signifying" or "Signification"; but, whereas In Standard English "signification" means the use of a word in attributing a particular meaning to a phrase, in the oral tradition of Afro-Americans, the use of signifying has taken on an arbitrary and dualistic or ambiguous sense, the major weight being given to the rhetoric reflecting the ontological state of the Afro-Americans themselves, rather than the English language community. The vernacular term "signification" has therefore become one which Mikhail Bakhtin has defined as "a dual voice"<sup>(1)</sup>, and which H.L. Gates said:

"...presupposes an 'encoded' intention to say one thing but to mean quite another."<sup>(2)</sup>

Ishmael Reed recognizes the creative and destructive power latent in the use of signifying and identifies in this rhetorical 'game' (as had Hurston before) the opportunity to write something original; however, in contrast to Hurston's use of signifying to represent the division of conscience within the main character of Janie<sup>(3)</sup>, Reed uses it within narrative texts of literary genres in order that they parody themselves.

### **2) What Does Parody Consist of?**

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines parody as:

"A composition in which the characteristic turns of thought and phrase of an author are mimicked and made to appear ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate subjects."<sup>(4)</sup>

Furthermore, Linda Hutcheon defines and explains the use of parody as distinct from a pastiche, the latter being an absurd imitation of a style without critical intention, and distinct from a satire, which is more concerned with a moral issue. Therein, parody:

"...in its ironic 'trans-contextualization' and inversion, is repetition with difference. A critical distance is implied between the backgrounded text being parodied and the new incorporating work, a distance usually signaled by irony."<sup>(5)</sup>

(1) See, for example, *Rabelais and His World*, Bakhtin, M.M. (1941) Trans. Hélène Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

(2) *The Signifying Monkey*, Gates, H.L., OUP, New York, 1989, p.85.

(3) *Their Eyes Were Watching God*, Hurston, Z.N., (1937), University of Illinois, Urbana, 1978.

(4) *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, revised and edited by Onions, C.T., Clarendon, Oxford, 1984.

(5) *A Theory of Parody*, Hutcheon, L., Methuen, New York, 1985, p.31.

Bakhtin has likened parody to the Carnival Comedy in which the model literary form becomes 'dethroned', thus there is an overthrowing of the traditional hierarchy plus the humorous derision of it. What Bakhtin calls "a regenerative ambivalence" to a serious-minded view on the world therefore results in parody constructing one of the main means by which there is cultural and literary renewal. Parody unmasks the choices made to represent some kind of reality in literary genres, and opens opportunities for a new expressiveness, and for this reason parody has often been preferred by contemporary writers, especially in America. <sup>(6)</sup>

### **3) Parody in Reed's Work.**

For Reed, parody enables him to remain outside the mainstream literary models in contemporary writing. Via parodying texts from traditional western literary genres, the author offers a criticism of the rigidity and close-mindedness of those western literary models, plus confronts the narrow exclusivity of that culture. At the same time, parody transforms literary models and opens up new avenues of expression, which, particularly for Reed, means using his neo-hoodoo aesthetic and a mode of expression which has more than one level. <sup>(7)</sup>

Furthermore, in his work, Reed launches his satire against the negative aspects of western culture, accusing it of having misrepresented the history of the Afro-Americans and to have attempted to subdue Black Culture. Simultaneously, Reed wishes to stamp his interpretation of Afro-American history on the world, and to re-evaluate that history via elements from Hoodoo culture.

The various levels of meaning which are created within Reed's work are, as previously stated, especially important via the equivocal voices expressed while using signifying. This is very important in the analysis of Reed's novel The Last Days of Louisiana Red.

### **4) The Last Days of Louisiana Red.**

This novel is a parody of a detective story and is based on the Greek tragedy Antigone by Sophocles. The parody is expressed via the character called Greek Chorus, who recounts the 'whodunit' in the style of the first novels within this genre, particularly those written by Edgar Allan Poe.<sup>(8)</sup> The 'Whodunit' is characterized by detection and fair play, that is, the reader has the same opportunity as the detective in the story to solve the investigation outlined during the unravelling of the plot. Additionally, the whodunit is presented in a pre-ordained sequence of events: the crime committed, the investigation and the solution to the case. There are also three fundamental characters: the victim, the investigator, and the murderer. Aside from this, there are recurrent motives involved: an apparently inexplicable mystery, suspects who supply various clues, the observation and rationale by the detective during the investigation, the unforeseen solution to the crime, the superiority of the often amateur investigator over the official police working on the case, and an assistant who is intellectually inferior to the amateur detective.


(6) *ibid.*

(7) See the essay in the WIN ONE, number 6.

(8) See, for example, The Purloined Letter by E.A.Poe.

We find these elements in Reed's novel, but modified or turned on their heads to suit his artistic intentions. For example, the solution to the crime evolves via humour, especially by using metaphor, and the motive behind the murder of Ed Yellings will demonstrate this aspect.

The murderer of Ed Yellings is soon identified as being part of an industrial spy ring which wishes to possess the secret recipe of Gumbo, an antidote to Louisiana Red, and something that the victim produced in the factory named The Solid Gumbo Works. Ed Yellings was in cohorts with other followers of the Hoodoo religion, reconstituting an old recipe, plus an ancient form of Hoodoo from New Orleans, so that the multiple metaphors indicate two things: 'Gumbo' represents aspects of Hoodoo culture which the author considers beneficial to Western culture, whereas, Louisiana Red, which is a sauce, represents males in general, who, in Occidental society, practise Hoodoo for nefarious reasons, considered by the author as a result of an excessive reliance on rationalism within that culture:



"When Ed Yellings entered Berkeley 'men were not eating men'; men were inflicting psychological stress on one another. Driving one another to high blood pressure, hardening of the arteries, which only made it worse, since the stabbings, rapings, muggings went on as usual. Ed Yellings, being a Worker, decided he would find some way to end Louisiana Red, which is what all of this activity was called." (9)

The detective, Papa LaBas, also relies on intuition in favour of logical-deductive thinking, and this includes divination and prediction via the stars. He's assisted by a baboon named Hamadryas who comes from the local zoo, and who has vital knowledge of past events, plus can see into the future. Peter Nazareth has identified in the character of Hamadryas the ancient Egyptian God Thoth. (10) This was the God who gave mankind writing, was the tongue of Ra, was steeped in magic and wisdom, and was often depicted with the head of an Ibis, or of a baboon. Therefore, the assistant in Reed's parody has greater intellectual and intuitive powers than the detective, once more a reversal of the usual whodunit scenario.

(9) The Last Days of Louisiana Red, Reed, I, Random House, New York (1974), p.6.

(10) "Heading them off at the Pass: The Fiction of Ishmael Reed," Nazareth, P., in Review of Contemporary Fiction, 4, 4, 1984, p.22

On page 135 of The Last Days of Louisiana Red, 'The Messenger' arrives, Reed's description of her identifying her as the Goddess Isis in ancient Egyptian theology:



"It was the messenger. Full lips, sharp-edged 'sculptured' nose, big bright Egyptian eyes. The messenger standing on the right-end side of Osiris."

This is an important moment in the book because the messenger from 'the dead' (Isis was the Goddess of Magic in the ancient Egyptian pantheon who tricks Ra into revealing secrets) helps LaBas identify the Moochers and the Argivians. The Moochers are caricatures of some of the intellectuals from the sixties and early seventies, as Lorenzo Thomas notes:

"The heart of the book is Reed's part denunciation of what he considers mistaken steps along the road to black liberation. Eldridge Cleaver, the Panthers, Angela Davis, and the other editors of Black Scholar are all pointedly parodied." <sup>(11)</sup>

In the novel, the Moochers are victims of 'Louisiana Red', as LaBas states:

"They are the Moochers, who cooperate with their 'oppression' for they have the mentality of the prey who thinks his destruction at the fangs of the killer is the natural order of things and colludes with his own death." <sup>(12)</sup>

Equally, the other people used by Louisiana Red are the Argivians, a band of hoodlums led by Ed Yelling's son Street, who is freed from prison by a spy from Louisiana Red, and who sets about victimizing his brother Wolf, the manager at the Great Gumbo Works. This constitutes a major theme in the book, and links the parody with Sophocles' Antigone – as will be specified in the next section of this essay. The investigation by LaBas becomes subsumed by the struggle between the Argivians and the Great Gumbo Works, his role emerging as more of a mediator between the real world and the supernatural, than as an investigator. As Lorenzo Thomas reaffirms:

"The hoodoo detective is less interested in logical deduction than he would be in divination... The case is solved, not with a clue, but with information given to LaBas by the 'messenger'." <sup>(13)</sup>

(11) Thomas, L., Two Crowns of Thoth: "A Study of Ishmael Reed's The Last Days of Louisiana Red, in Obdisian, II, March 1976, p.14

(12) TLDLR, p.172.

(13) Two Crowns of Thoth, Thomas, L., (ibid), pp.13-14.



The information given by the messenger also makes the reader solve the crime prior to LaBas, thereby not only inverting the usual denouement, but denying the reader the usual suspense inherent in a detective story. “Good” triumphs over “evil”, as per the standard detective tale, but Reed places more emphasis on the inter-racial conflict and violence within the Afro-American community, alongside the fundamental role of the oppressive Anglo-American culture, rather than just the resolution of a crime puzzle.

### 5) The Parody of Antigone.

Sophocles’ Antigone is mainly parodied in two ways: via the inclusion of Ed Yellings’ four offspring who are comparable with the four children of Oedipus; and the use of a chorus who wishes to comment on the events occurring.

Antigone in Reed’s novel is represented by Minnie, but as per many of the previously mentioned aspects to Reed’s opus, Minnie is the precise opposite of what the original Antigone believed in. Minnie is a capricious and violent youth who was corrupted by her nanny - a woman who was a spy for the Louisiana Red. Minnie has been turned against her family, and the character is always described using an ironic tone:

“This was part of a three-day ceremony celebrating Minnie’s ascension to Queen of the Moochers, which ended with an old-fashioned torchlight parade to Provo Park in Berkeley.” <sup>(14)</sup>

Minnie has a negative influence on those around her. She is a rebel, especially with regard to the male characters in the book, and she uses her feminine charms to get what she wants; Reed has openly expressed how Minnie represents some Feminists’ behaviour:

“That’s what makes Susan Brownmiller and people like that frightening to me. Using the collective pronoun, she wrote that the black man encouraged rape and supported rape, which suggests that one person stands for the whole group and implicates all the black men.”

Minnie is a counterbalance to Sister, who represents Ismene from Sophocles’ tragedy. Sophocles paints Ismene as a cowardly and passive character, one too frightened to help Antigone bury Polynices. Reed, however, makes Sister an equal rebel in that she refuses to share Minnie’s ideas and to participate in her nefarious activities:



(14) TLDLR, p.19.

[Sister] “Why is there always the need for blood, Minnie? Why do you always see ‘many casualties’ as being victorious?”

[Minnie] “We Moochers understand nothing but blood. Blood is truth. Blood is life. Drink blood. Drink it. Blood. Blood.” <sup>(15)</sup>

Sister, like Ismene, cannot deter Minnie (Antigone) from her commitment to rebellion, causing in the process fraternal conflict between Street, who represents Polynices, and Wolf (Eteocles). Minnie persuades Street and his hoodlums to attack the factory run by Wolf, in a similar vain to Polynices’ attack on Thebes. Street’s seven hoodlums also reflect the seven men from Argo who accompanied Polynices in the attack, hence the name Argivians in Reed’s parody. The two bothers also kill each other, as occurs in Sophocles’ tragedy.

The important cultural aspect to the parody lies in the Yellings family feud, which mirrors the conflict within the Afro-American community and the undermining of racial harmony in society, particularly evident during the ‘60s and ‘70s, though still relevant today. Ultimately, Minnie’s rebellion against her brothers and LaBas, though often presented in a humorous way, is none-the-less comparable to Antigone’s rebellion against the male authority figure represented by Creon.

## **6) The Character called Chorus.**

Whereas the chorus in ancient Greek drama commented on the play and was presented as a voice apart from the main characters, in Reed’s novel, the Chorus intrudes on the action, to the point where he openly announces his intention to do this. He arrives in Berkeley after:

“...what one critic called ‘a valiant’ attempt to restore the Chorus to its rightful role,” <sup>(16)</sup>

And cites Antigone as being responsible for his decline:

“Antigone comes down through the ages as the epitome of the free spirit against the forces of tyranny. However, some say she went too far. I say she went too far; not only because she opposed a good and just authority, but because she was the beginning of my end.” <sup>(17)</sup>

Reed makes the Chorus an ever more significant character in his novel and, when the Chorus identifies Minnie as a modern day equivalent of the woman he believes caused his downfall, he proceeds to interrupt Minnie’s discourse, to the point where Minnie gets angry:

“YOU LISTEN TO ME. LET ME FINISH. LET ME FINISH!” <sup>(18)</sup>

Towards the end of the story, it is the Chorus who brings about Minnie’s downfall.

(15) TLDLR, p.57

(16) TLDLR, p.23

(17) TLDLR, p.63

(18) TLDLR, p.159

Additionally, Reginald Martin sustains that:

“The Chorus also fulfils a significant function by symbolizing black Americans who will not disappear, even though they are relegated by more powerful forces to minor roles. Never satisfied with this position, black Americans want to be placed where they believe they belong: in the forefront of the action.” <sup>(19)</sup>

Another function of the Chorus in ancient Greek drama was the Dionysian one of representation via music and dance, connecting Man with the natural world. It was a unifying voice, judging and explaining using references to mythology while utilizing and stimulating the collective memory of the audience.

Reed takes these aspects and orientates them towards a fusion of art and the oral culture of Hoodoo. The tensions between the Dionysian and Apollonian elements, represented by the Chorus plus the action in the story, become in Reed’s work the tensions between Hoodoo culture, and Western cultural values.

## 7) Conclusion.

The Last Days of Louisiana Red constitutes a wholly original work, superficially a detective story, but incorporating, via parody and the ample use of humour, the neo-hoodoo aesthetic, plus traditional vernacular language deriving from the authentic Afro-American culture. His use of signifying to punctuate the story with dual meaning, taking an ancient Greek tragedy towards a modern interpretation which allows for creativity and originality, makes Reed’s writing a distinct advancement on the previous Afro-American novels, a progression which continues even to this day.



(19) Martin, R., “Ishmael Reed: Sidelights”, in May H. Straub D., Contemporary Authors, vol XXV, Gale Research Inc., USA, 1989, p.381

**Gina and Early – *Short Scenes by Eric Trowbridge.***

**Midnight at the el Lugar Stop & Shop**

**I**

**Gina:** So, how's the physics class going for you?

**Early:** Good, but not so good.

**Gina:** Oh?

**Early:** Yea. Well, it's really amazing to me that observations can be quantized, and in turn these numbers can be arranged to predict the behavior of future observations, and to such an impressive degree of accuracy...

**Gina:** So? What's the problem then? Trouble at home?

**Early:** My problem is that I don't know exactly what's going on.

**Gina:** What's new?

**Early:** You know, you're almost capable of allowing me to guffaw.

**Gina:** I guess that will have to do.

**Early:** (sips his coffee while peering into the embracing, empty distance)

**Gina:** Did you know that this place was founded in 1964 by...

**Early:** Okay, so, for example, a basic, 101 fact is that despite their respective horizontal velocities, two equivalent masses will hit the ground at the same time when expelled from the same height, from the same origin, and under the influence of gravity...along with what we call error, factored in as much as possible. Right?

**Gina:** Right.

**Early:** Right. So, what in the hell *is* gravity?

**Gina:** I don't know, why don't you ask it?

**Early:** ...

**Gina:** Listen, nobody knows what things are in themselves. Basic Kant. The best we can do is to either have or invent reliable methods to understand the behavior of the world's most enduring objects. The rifle is an excellent example here, and sex.

**Early:** I'm not going to have sex with you.

**Gina:** Huh?



**Early:** If we can't know things in themselves then the only way to know ourselves is to ensure we do not classify ourselves as being things which can be classified?

**Gina:** Sure, but back to your question. I don't know what gravity is either. What I'm hearing from you is: I don't even know what a "what" is. I might say that this what is that and that what is this other thing, but I haven't accomplished much in the way of understanding except for rendering distinctions, classifying things into sets and or into groups, into relations. Isn't this what you're talking about?

**Early:** Yes. But what's your point?

**Gina:** My point is, be glad you have some model to go by at all.

**Early:** Now you're sounding like a minimalist. The "down to earth" bumpkin saying something similar to, "Grass? It's grass" to some ignorant outsider who doesn't know the grammar of the definition, and who desires to understand a phenomenon not only by what is spoke of and proclaimed.

**Gina:** You're kind of bitter.

**Early:** I'm not bitter. I want to know what is the composition of the world I'm a part of, not just an explanation of it.

**Gina:** Well, welcome to the group.

**Early:** Then we're a fit of talking, mirroring what we see and making zero sense of things other than what's useful?

**Gina:** Pretty much.

## II

**Early:** There are no rats in this place.

**Gina:** Who told you?

**Early:** I noticed.

**Editor's Note:** That concludes the articles in this Edition. The final two pages have the solutions and answers to the problem page, so if you don't wish to know those yet, finish reading here.

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**Graham Powell**

### The Problem Page Answers.

1) **The Problem Page** conundrum: each letter of the alphabet has a sequential number, a=1,b=2, etc. Therefore:

**“Which country is it? England.”**

2) Number Problem: Yes, you can solve it by starting from two different numbers:  **$5 \times 14 + 11 / 9 - 6 = 3$  or  $6 \times 5 - 14 + 11 / 9 = 3$**

### 3) General Knowledge Crossword Answers.

1 B	O	2 M	B	3 A	Y		4 G	5 E	6 M
O		E		C		7 P	A	L	O
B		D				8 I	P	A	D
	9 H	I		10 P	11 A	L		12 T	A
13 M		14 A	15 D		16 L	A	17 B	E	L
18 A	19 G	N	U	20 S		21 R	E		S
22 D	O		23 M	O	P		24 A	N	
25 D	R	26 A	B				D		27 B
28 O	E	N	O		29 T		E		I
30 G	D	P		31 L	O	N	D	O	N

Across

2. Now known as Mumbai.

4. Precious stone.

7. Pole or post in Italian.

Down

1. Name of a funny Hope.

2. Average.

3. Half a shocking rock group.

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 8. One of Job's masterpieces.   | 4. A space between.                             |
| 9. Informal greeting.   | 5. To make happy.(Verb)                         |
| 10. A friendly DVD format.  | 6. 'Can' & 'must' are these types of verb.      |
| 12. Voluntary soldier says thanks.  | 7. Portuguese support for a village in Goa?     |
| 14. God's year.   | 11. Paul Simon says you can call me this.       |
| 16. A tag.  | 13. Crazy animal.                               |
| 18. 'Lamb' in Latin.  | 15. Famous elephant.                            |
| 21. Study Gods in this lesson.  | 17. Hair with small wooden pieces.(Adj.)        |
| 22. An auxiliary verb in English.   | 19. Punctured by a bull.                        |
| 23. The Beatles' cleaning implement?  | 20. Sounds like the 'Dominant' note in a scale. |
| 24. One indefinite article in English.  | 26. Chadian political force, 1960-61.           |
| 25. Dull.   | 27. Put your waste here.                        |
| 28. Greek prefix meaning 'wine'.  | 29. A preposition in English.                   |
| 30. Total produced by a country.  |   |
| 31. The answer to question 3 in the quiz below said, if you were tired of this, you were tired of life. |   |

#### **4) Quiz Answers.**

- 1) Villeneuve was the French admiral at the Battle of Trafalgar.
- 2) In 1209 there were civil riots in Oxford and several scholars were killed. Many fled to Cambridge and Cambridge University evolved from that exodus.
- 3) Doctor Samuel Johnson, to his biographer, James Boswell.
- 4) Nuie is a coral atoll about 1,500 miles north east of New Zealand.
- 5) Professor Blasco's research indicates that short telomeres indicate (and cause) aging.